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DIFFERENTIATED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ

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Transition patterns in post-Gulf War Iraqi Kurdistan are a function of external aid. Generous aid-related opportunities have provided recognition, revenues, and legitimacy to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that has encouraged economic and political development. Over time, differentials have emerged so that the Kurdistan region has become more viable than the southern and central regions, reinforcing the idea of a strong autonomous region in a federal Iraqi state or a Kurdish quasi-state apart from Iraq.[1] This influence has become inflated due to the weakness of the central government and the absence of viable state structures. Yet, a deeper look into the nature of transition processes reveals that in contrast to popular images of a "booming and autonomous Kurdistan," the region is actually weak and dependent. Like other de-facto quasi-states — or regions that lack full sovereignty and seek national recognition or independence — the Kurdish quasi-state depends upon continued external patronage (i.e., the U.S.), a weak central government, and international support to champion its cause as a victim of dictatorship and human rights abuses.[2] Most revenues in the Kurdistan region are not gained from official taxation policies but rather, the central government, international donors, underground economies linked to regional states, and resource exploitation. The very survival of the Kurdish quasi-state is contingent upon maintaining the status quo and not attempting to alter it.

Figure 1.1. Truck Traffic at Iranian-Iraqi Kurdish Border Area (Photo Courtesy of *Awene* Newspaper, Suleymaniya, Iraq)

THE BENEFITS OF STALEMATE

With the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'thist regime in 2003 and attempts to create a federal Iraq, the Kurdistan region has gained new forms of legitimacy and leverage. The U.S. government's emphasis on regional and ethnic group quotas as a means of determining the distribution of resources, the Transitional Law for the Administration of Iraq signed in March 2004 (TAL), and the 2005 Iraqi constitution have provided the Kurdistan region with rights and revenues as a distinct political entity in the country. Kurdish officials have gained important representation in Baghdad as a national community, which in turn, has increased the KRG's influence in the central government to accommodate Kurdish demands for autonomy.

Larger budgets and more comprehensive projects have advanced economic development and the internal sovereignty of the Kurdistan region.[3] In contrast to early relief programs based on food and fuel handouts, since 2003 foreign donors and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have engaged in capacity-building and infrastructure projects that have reinforced the autonomy of the Kurdish north. As part of a relatively stable and developing region in a federal Iraq the KRG can now negotiate commercial and diplomatic agreements with foreign companies and governments unwilling to work in the insecure southern and central regions. By 2008, Russia, France, Britain, and the Czech Republic had established offices or consulates in Arbil, further legitimizing the status of the Kurdish quasi-state. The KRG also participates in high-level international conferences as a regional entity, receives official governmental delegations, and has become part of the Iraqi

• *Continued on pages 12–14* •

FROM BAUHAUS TO BAGHDAD: THE POLITICS OF BUILDING THE TOTAL UNIVERSITY

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DESIGN RESEARCH, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, AND CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

The stage for the drama of modernization in Iraq was, unsurprisingly, the capital city of Baghdad. The creation of a Development Board in the early 1950s made it possible for the new nation to exploit its oil wealth on a large scale for the first time by systematically channeling resources into infrastructure and economic development.[1] Baghdad was not only the seat of government and home to the administrative apparatus that devised the development program but also the site of some of the most symbolic elements of that program, a showcase of modernity beginning with a new city plan and a number of significant buildings.[2] These buildings were commissioned to five men from the United States and Europe, each of whom easily ranked among his respective country's and the world's best known architects. Baghdad University went to Walter Gropius, a sports stadium to Le Corbusier, an Opera House to Frank Lloyd Wright, the Development Board headquarters building to Gio Ponti, and a museum to Alvar Aalto[3] (figure 2.1).

Alone among this illustrious group, Walter Gropius achieved not only great success in his building program, but also the most pervasive modernist influence on architecture in Iraq and the Middle East. An investigation into how this came about reveals little-known dimensions of the politics of building in 1950s Baghdad. During these years, center stage was occupied by Iraq's changing rulers and their assorted ministers. Behind the scenes, however, some remarkably influential, well-educated, young Iraqis exerted important influence on the process of reshaping Baghdad.



Figure 2.1. Map of Baghdad circa 1960 showing locations of the projects commissioned to architects from the West. Buildings by Ponti and Le Corbusier were constructed but only Gropius' project was built and substantially expanded. Wright's opera house and Aalto's museum were never built. Map produced by the author and B. Hunter

Baghdad in the 1950s was vibrant with the presence of youthful artists, sculptors, architects, and engineers, most of them trained in the West. The architects were eager to break the British monopoly on building, dominated since the early 1920s by the neoclassical tradition prevalent in European colonies. Rifat Chadirji, Mohammed Makiya,[4] Medhat Ali Madhloom, Hisham Munir, Qahtan Awni, and Nizar and Ellen Jawdat were among elite, Western-educated architects who used their knowledge and positions to support Iraq's ambitious development plan and modernist vision.[5] Significantly, Nizar Ali Jawdat, son of Iraq's ambassador to the United States, was a student of Walter Gropius at Harvard University's Graduate School of Design. He married fellow student Ellen Bovey and returned with her to Iraq where they began architectural careers not long before the Development Board embarked on its building program. By 1957, Nizar's father was prime minister under King Faisal II. These family connections enabled the young architects to help convince Iraq's Development Board to broaden their choice of architects, as did the efforts of architect Rifat Chadirji, a young Development Board employee, who recalls:

> When I saw the list of who they are commissioning to do buildings … it was all by old-fashioned British architects, mostly third-rate … I made an appointment to see the Minister of Planning, with my colleague [Kahtan] Awni ….

"You are inviting people to design prestigious buildings and spending money. Why not invite the best?" So he said, "Who are the best?"[6]

Most of the architects who agreed to build in Baghdad were on the list Chadirji submitted to the planning minister. Thus, young architects had significant influence on commissions for Baghdad and, in the case of the Jawdats, also helped secure for their teacher, Walter Gropius, the gem commission and a positive relationship with those in power (figure 2.2).

Baghdad University came to Walter Gropius after he had been in America for twenty years. He had begun his practice in Europe where his first building, the Fagus boot factory, won him instant fame and became the model for the "New Architecture" Gropius promoted for the rest of his life.[7] He

Figure 2.2. Walter Gropius with young Iraqi architects visiting the Baghdad University site resplendent with palm trees.
"This site has the great advantage of being flanked on three of its sides by the River Tigris so that no matter how much the city may develop and expand it will not submerge the University or become mixed with it."
(*Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq* 1960: 11; Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)

Figure 2.3. Plan for the Baghdad University central core with the library, auditorium, administration, faculty tower, student center, museum, theater, and art gallery surrounded by academic buildings. The irregular pattern of buildings and courtyards emerged as a result of existing dikes. Most of the buildings were low rise. (Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)

Figure 2.4. Walter Gropius (with camera) surveying the site of Baghdad University, Hisham Munir in the foreground, completed Faculty Tower in far left corner. My gratitude to Mr. Munir for the use of his photograph

founded the Staatliches Bauhaus in 1919, a holistic architecture and design school offering a new paradigm for a post-World War I architecture that would be functional, cheap, and mass produced. Gropius envisioned "no teachers or pupils at the Bauhaus but a workshop system following the guild practices of masters, journeymen and apprentices."[8] Although the Bauhaus itself came to an abrupt end in Germany, its influence did not. Throughout his career, Gropius advocated Bauhaus principles for a collaborative design process that eventually revolutionized architectural education throughout the world.[9]

Years before the Development Board offered Gropius the Baghdad University commission in 1957, the Jawdats worked to bring the architect to Iraq and introduce him to key decision makers, ensuring that he would be among the first Western architects to be considered for a project.[10] On a 1954 trip to Japan, Gropius stopped in Baghdad to visit the Jawdats. Very likely, this was the occasion for an agenda Ellen Jawdat prepared.[11] It shows a lunch at the U.S. Embassy and a Sunday evening dinner. Attendees included representatives from the U.S. Embassy and two members of Iraq's foreign affairs ministry but also Nedim al-Pachachi, former development minister then serving as economics minister. The Sunday dinner included a number of Iraqi architects trained abroad (in the U.S., U.K, Sweden, and American University in Beirut) in addition to Development Board member Abdul Jabbar Chelebi along with a tireless champion of the Baghdad University project, Dr. Abdul Aziz Dury. At that time, Drury had been invited to spend a year teaching Islamic studies at Harvard. Also attending was Henry Weins, director of the Point Four program. The U.S. Point Four Mission was begun with a 1951 agreement between the United States and Iraq "to cooperate in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills and in related activities designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Iraq."[12] Gropius began his journey toward the university commission very well connected indeed.

The following excerpt from Ellen's letter to Gropius after this 1955 Baghdad encounter sheds light on both a successful visit and the outlook of the young, educated elite his ideas influenced:

> Not only we, but everybody who met you reacted in the same way — we felt as though a large window had opened … such a wealth of new ideas, wise advice, and most of all a calm optimism, that we must find some way of reviving the experience.[13]

She added that unlike most Western visitors, who showed "sweeping optimism" after "their first shock of horror," Gropius demonstrated an "instinctive understanding of the situation, in no way minimizing the problems, yet not being overwhelmed by them." Jawdat also clearly expressed a desire to find a way for Gropius "to make your contribution to this country."[14]

A symbolic centerpiece of independence and modernization, Baghdad University was a singularly important Development Board architectural project. Educational institutions were crucial to emerging countries such as Iraq as they forged new identities and built modern institutions. A university on the Western model represented the foundation for an indigenous knowledge infrastructure. In 1957, at the age of seventy-

Figure 2.5. View of the Central Library from a walkway. Sunscreens were an essential feature for sun protection but also a prominent design element Gropius used in all his projects. Using the dikes as walkways allowed different levels and reflected strict separation of pedestrian and vehicular areas. (Drawing by Helmut Jacoby; Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)



Figure 2.6. View of University's entrance arch, titled "Open Mind." Transplanted palm trees defined the monumental entrance and road system

four, Walter Gropius received the lucrative, long-term university commission. It would gradually transform his Cambridge, Massachusetts practice, The Architectural Collaborative (TAC), into a large corporate firm that pioneered in setting the parameters of post-World War II international architectural practice. Baghdad University remained Gropius' largest architectural commission and one of his most influential projects. His firm and its educational partners defined not only the architectural program but also the university's teaching principles; TAC designed all the iterations of a master plan and constructed numerous university buildings in a long-term relationship that weathered two assassinations and four changes of government (figure 2.3).

Gropius began with the connections to help him win and then steer this plum commission through unfamiliar bureaucracies and troubled times. His 1959 contract reveals how pragmatic he was in arranging details to fuel his business, guarantee steady payment, and insure his chances of success. The contract included provisions, from a $1 million payment deposited into a Swiss account and $2.3 million in the second year, to a guarantee that the contract would bind successor regimes.[15] Guided by his well-connected Iraqi friends, Gropius was able to lock up the details of practicalities and payments. With strong political support in place, TAC found an Iraqi firm for "guidance through the maze of local customs and regulations" and advice on local materials, building techniques, and regulations.[16] Baghdad-based architects Madhloom and Munir[17] ensured that TAC could continue through all phases of the project[18] (figure 2.4). It is clear, however, that progress and payment were not always smooth, a fact that made Gropius' close ties to the Jawdats particularly valuable. In 1958, after the revolution, Nizar Jawdat intervened with the Board and its bank to speed the payment process, as Ellen Jawdat recounted to Gropius' wife Ise:

> We were horrified to think that nothing had been done in the financial department, and Nizar buzzed right down to find out what was going on. I assure you there has been no change of mind, political or financial, but … just the snarl of red tape with which most governments seem to be afflicted …. There is no lack of good faith on their part, be assured, and they were all impressed with the way he approached the problem, and are irrevocably convinced that they have the right man.[19]

Likewise, policies of the Iraqi government created many political and social uncertainties. "Business is now completely at a standstill," Nizar Jawdat observed hastening to reassure Gropius that the Board, "I understand, [is] anxious to continue with some of the

main scheme, I am sure the university will fall under that category."[20] This may have been in response to a letter of September 1958, wherein Ise wrote that:

> TAC has no direct information from Baghdad as yet, and they were told that ... quite a while may elapse before they will get around to university plans.[21]

At this time, General Abdul Karim Kassem was in control of Iraq after the assassination of the young King Faisal II on 14 July 1958. Despite his sense that the new government was actively pursuing an agenda against various elites, including himself, Jawdat clearly continued to maintain for Gropius a practical connection to Development Board activities. The University project, however, hardly faltered. Gropius quietly continued work on the master plan even after the military coup, relying on the strength of his prescient, regime-change-proof contractual monthly payment.

TAC principals Robert S. McMillan and Louis A. McMillen and young associates Richard Brooker and H. Morse Payne, Jr., formed the original Baghdad University design team working in Cambridge.[22] Of the principals, Louis McMillen was most directly involved in the project, especially in contractual discussions and travel to Baghdad. Nevertheless, to the outside world and certainly to the client, Gropius was the chief architect and creator of Baghdad University. Using his signature "teamwork" methodology, Gropius oversaw the development of the university master plan without ever putting pencil to paper, a coordinator who allowed others to design "in the spirit of his ideas."[23]

During weekly review sessions, the group gathered to discuss progress and an attentive Gropius apparently had a gift for bringing out the best in his team members and their collaborators. According to Louis McMillen, Gropius "took a very active role as a design critic during the master planning and preliminary design phases."[24] His method was flexible enough to accept ideas presented by second-tier members of the firm, among whom H. Morse Payne counted himself.[25] As the young author of the master plan, Payne communicated his ideas in expressive thumbnail sketches. For the weekly rounds of conference room discussions, the group used in-house sketches and renderings prepared by Payne and other young collaborators.

Gropius' team suggested a practical



Figure 2.7. Master plan of Baghdad University showing the ring roads defining the central pedestrian core of the campus and the residential and other auxiliary buildings. (Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)

approach to the campus. He wanted to avoid "too much Americanism" for "a school that will help conquer the illiteracy problem and train all kinds of leaders to use the country's wealth wisely."[26] While this statement seems to leaven a certain cultural imperialism with a hint of cultural sensitivity, Gropius proposed to let control of the hot climate dominate the architectural motif. In order "[t]o counteract the excessive heat from May to September," TAC made sure that "not only are all the buildings air conditioned throughout ... but they are put close enough to overshadow each other, providing simultaneously a reduction in temperature as well as short horizontal line of communication."[27] According to McMillen, TAC researched and applied evaporative cooling principles and also studied sun control, proposing sun breakers. Roof overhangs above window openings, louvers, grills, and white concrete "umbrella" roofs deflected sunlight; sprinklers turned upward cooled the air above by evaporation.[28] In addition, Gropius' engineers "developed some very advanced cooling air conditioning machinery ... throughout all buildings"[29] (figure 2.5).

Figure 2.8. The University Mosque was initially a traditional design but it morphed into a large dome supported on three points suspended over a circular water basin to reflect light. The exterior was to have glazed turquoise tile and a rectangular praying area extending from outdoors to indoors. (Drawing by Helmut Jacoby; Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)

Figure 2.9. Walter Gropius taking a photograph of the Faculty Tower, one of the first buildings completed. It was designed at the behest of General Kassem, who wanted to see the building from his window across town. Kassem saw to it that University construction had a high priority. (Photo Courtesy of Hisham Munir)

If we credit Ernesto Rogers' judgment that Bauhaus "purity [was] set aside" in the university design to make room for "liberties of the vernacular,"[30] the vernacularization seems to have been serendipitous rather than intentional. Speaking of the overall campus design, H. Morse Payne recalls that he "stumbled upon the concept by accident," inspired by the existing dikes or retaining walls on the site. "We would have blitzed the site," according to Payne, referring to the usual practice of cutting down all the trees to prepare a clean slate for an orthogonal plan. As it was, he adopted "the local idiomatic form," incorporating many of the trees from a large date orchard that had occupied the site and transplanting other trees to outline the road system[31] (figure 2.6). "It was a stroke of luck and Gropius was supportive," Payne said about the rather organic evolution of the plan.[32] Gropius also responded positively to Payne's resulting use of courtyards. Existing trees and canals on the site were incorporated, and Gropius endorsed using the rows of "irregularly zigzagging bunds or dikes — about 10 feet high ... a significant feature of the otherwise flat site." Thus a formal pattern emerged from the organically constructed dikes

already on the site and the "heavy irregular lines" and asymmetry were then described as creating "great spatial variety and complexity."[33] Perhaps the flexibility suggested by the educational plan that called for multiple-use classrooms also introduced elasticity into some of the stylistic formal treatments associated with the New Architecture. Or, as Gropius himself stressed, "the university of Baghdad is planned for flexible adaptation to change."[34]

The master plan grouped the common classrooms, lecture halls, and laboratories around the asymmetrical central plaza with the student center, library, auditorium, theater, administration, faculty club, and faculty office tower around the periphery for the "general life of the university in contrast to the specific educational function at the center."[35] Low-rise buildings along a scattered campus with nothing over three stories were part of a deliberate intent to build on a human scale. A ring road around the academic area expressed the Bauhaus "unity of function" tenet, limiting vehicular access except for the purpose of servicing administrative buildings[36] (figure 2.7).

The mosque was situated to create a "quiet oasis near the central area of the campus that would be alive and teeming."[37] Over the years, the mosque, which started as a square building with a typical Islamic dome, was transformed into an unusual design, a large circular paved court with two groups of palm trees and a central rectangular prayer platform surrounded by a circular pool of water, all covered by a gigantic concrete dome supported on three points. It was functional but equally, for its designers, it was dramatic. Referring to the courtyards and dome, one critic noted, "For the first time, typological and formal elements drawn from oriental tradition and yet in no sense 'vernacular' appear in an architectural project signed by Gropius."[38] Indeed, rather than characterize a contextual use of vaults and domes, Gropius explained it as giving "dramatic accent in the silhouette"[39] (figure 2.8). This dramatic effect in key buildings — the auditorium, mosque, museum, and passages — was intentional and meant to soften the rectilinear buildings.

In the end, Gropius' plan celebrated International rather than local style. Although, as noted, the plan presented Baghdad's extreme climate as its main inspiration, the responding system of horizontal cantilevers and vertical baffles on every facade was precisely the same system TAC used in other countries and other climates. The structures were remarkably similar to other Gropius projects, such as the Athens Embassy, which had the same fluted roof as the auditorium originally proposed for Baghdad University. Contemporary descriptions underscored that the project was typical of TAC and that other projects were "prototypes of the Baghdad scheme," especially three projects then completed or underway: a school designed for *Collier's* magazine, Hua Tung University in Shanghai, China, and the Harvard Graduate Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts.



Figure 2.10. The photograph on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq* emphasized the importance of the University, acknowledged as the "apex" of the "broadly based [education] pyramid" in the political agenda of the new government. "As is imperative with a rapidly developing country, vocational and technological education is receiving special attention from the Government." (*Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq*, July 1961 p. 11; Photo: *Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq*, August 1960)

Gropius and TAC were clearly guided by the Bauhaus universalist philosophy. Baghdad University carried the unmistakable Gropius "signature" at the level of the overall campus and at the scale of building design and architectural detail. It was technologically advanced, modern, and universal. It signified for Gropius, as he wrote, "the balance of unity and diversity, of integration and differentiation in order to provide for the students the intellectual and emotional experience from both East and West,"[40] although the Eastern element was fortuitous and limited. In addition to creating practical buildings, the overall design also meant to produce psychological impact, defining and promoting an academic and social life Gropius and his followers thought to be universally appropriate.

Gropius himself had occasion to honor the design flexibility he advocated for the university. General Kassem's government ensured Gropius "priority for execution of the project,"[41] and in fact enlarged the scope of the project

when the General requested a tall building, one that he could see "from his office in the Ministry of Defense that was some miles up the river from the University site."[42] TAC easily accommodated the symbolic monumentality required and the enthusiastic General quickly approved construction of a 20-story faculty office tower visible from his office, as well as a symbolic, 80-foot campus entrance arch known as "The Open Mind," and the ring road (figure 2.9). When Kassem was assassinated in 1963 by his chief of staff, Colonel Abdul Salem Arif, the project continued. Shortly after Tender II was let, the Colonel died accidentally; his brother took over until 1968 when he was asked to leave by the Ba'th Party. In 1966 Gropius went to Baghdad to meet with officials and was warmly welcomed by the client, the Minister of Works and Housing, and by other architects in Baghdad. By this time, a great project was greater still, with additional buildings and the capacity of the university increased from 12,000 to 18,000 students.[43] As leadership changed, so did identity. For instance, when Islamic ideals began to emerge, TAC was tasked to design Tahrir College for women isolated on the far north of the site.

Gropius' Baghdad University can legitimately be considered his master project in which the totality of his ideas about modern architecture were revealed and implemented. The university also became something of a Gropius handbook for spreading encompassing Bauhaus ideas to a new part of the world. In the West, contemporary assessments of the project could not have been more laudatory. Indeed, the Baghdad University design was recognized by many as Gropius' evolutionary development of his universal educational principles. As Giulio Carlo Argan expressed it, "Gropius is finally going to erect in Baghdad his ideal project — the university town."[44] As early as 1961, *Architectural Record* affirmed Gropius as the master of architectural method and a major cultural force:

> To an architect and teacher long dedicated to the principle that members of the profession must play the broadest possible role in the pursuit of a better life for mankind, the total design of a university is a goal achieved.[45]

No one better summarized the way Baghdad University was commended for its ideological — rather than architectural — success, than Ernesto Rogers, who saw that Gropius had "thoroughly effected the perfect symbiosis between moral instructional content and architectonic space for the instrumental and symbolic purpose of that vital organism," a full realization of what the Bauhaus was, "this testament to rationality and faith in mankind."[46] In the West, Baghdad University was indeed embraced as the realization of the New Architecture Gropius had promised.

More important, the university was well received in Iraq and the Middle East. As McMillen noted years later, "the client, although demanding, was highly professional and very appreciative of TAC's input, particularly the efforts made by Gropius."[47] Prominently featured in reports distributed by the new Iraqi Republic, Baghdad University introduced a new era in "Iraq as in other Arab countries [where] the need and the demand for education was tremendous."[48] It was up to its purpose: "to enable the country to go forward at the speed required by the changes that were taking place in it and in the modern world to which it wished to belong."[49] Underscoring its importance, politically and symbolically, the foundation stone for the university was laid by the Prime Minister Major-General Abdul Karim Kassem on 14 July 1959, the first anniversary of the revolution that toppled the monarchy. The *Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq* represented much of the Iraqi press when it proudly declared a year later that "A world-famous architect was selected in the person of Dr. Walter Gropius to design the buildings and his plans have been completed and approved" and will "give Iraq one of the most splendidly designed universities in the world"[50] (figure 2.10). The following year, the *Bulletin* announced the expansion of the project. "When completed, in two stages, over the next 12 years and at a total cost of 45 million pounds sterling, it will accommodate 80,000 resident students in one of the most imaginatively designed set of University buildings in the world."[51]

Among all the international giants called to Baghdad, Gropius was the most successful in setting an architectural standard for Iraq and, as a result, for much of the Middle East. Conveying an aura of technological development

Figure 2.11. Model of the central campus area showing library, auditorium, administration, and faculty tower and shared common classrooms, lecture halls, and laboratories set around asymmetrical courtyards. Gropius committed to a pedestrian-only central core. (Photo: Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Design School)

and modernity, Gropius' buildings were accepted as worthy symbols of a nation's entry onto the world stage. The Baghdad University campus became a key symbol of Iraq's membership in the community of modern nations, a linchpin in the sense of a new identity that was part of the nationalizing process. It also became a decisive case study for the dissemination of architectural modernism outside Europe and North America at a time when Western ideas were embraced (figure 2.11). The modernist tenets it embodied incited a generation of younger architects outside the West to be part of the New Architecture. To Iraqi elites — and certainly the young, influential architects who studied with Gropius or came under his influence — Bauhaus ideas about the modern and flexible organization were politically suited to a desire to participate in an advanced, technological world.

Figure 2.12. Gropius in the foreground of the 80-foot "Open Mind" monument, the symbolic gateway to the campus. "As the physical structure of the University is growing, the academic reforms and developments will be proceeding that are necessary to make the mind and soul of the University worthy of their home." (*Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq*, August 1960 p. 11; Photo Courtesy of Hisham Munir)

But the creation of Baghdad University was, perhaps, less a matter of big ideas and prestigious modernist tenets than of the tissue of connections Gropius enjoyed, as much about the offstage preparations as the center stage action. Fortuitously for him, the social and political positioning of young architects such as the Jawdats, Chadirji, Makiya, Madhloom, and Munir smoothed his way to the most desirable commission available, guided his path through various bureaucracies in a politically volatile atmosphere, and eased the establishment of steady payments that sustained TAC for many years (figure 2.12). Indeed, as early as 1955, Ellen Jawdat was eager to lay the groundwork for acceptance, telling Gropius that "a CIAM group might be formed here," a development that would have institutionalized the modernist/internationalist movement led by Gropius, Le Corbusier, and Mies Van der Rohe through their Congres International d'Architecture Moderne.[52] As late as 1964, while describing "living on the lip of a volcano" in view of a regime that "calls for the destruction of ... our class ... those who think independently," Ellen Jawdat nonetheless conveyed to Gropius a well-positioned acquaintance's "success with solving the University problems." In fact, Ellen wrote,

> I took the children to see the University site, and it was quite thrilling to see the fine administration building soaring up against the pale green evening sky ... Perhaps there is hope for Iraq.[53]

In 1967, the Jawdats clearly remained involved with TAC and the Baghdad University project, writing of their intent to "get some information on the Women's College program."[54] For more than a decade, then, these young, Western-trained architects remained key but unheralded players. Connected to the Iraqi power structure, however tenuously at times, they were able to help TAC maintain contacts, keep a positive profile, and make progress on a modernist university project in which they had unwavering faith.

[1] For a detailed discussion of this important phase in Iraq's modern development, see

Fahim Qubain, *The Reconstruction of Iraq 1950–1957* (New York: Praeger, 1958). My thanks go to Mr. Qubain for a fruitful interview in 2007.

[2] I have summarized the Development Board's work and the milieu in which Baghdad building took place in "1950s Baghdad, Modern and International," The American Academic Research Institute in Iraq *Newsletter* 2-2 (2007): 1–7. Current research is made possible by a TAARII grant for which I am very grateful. I would like to thank the MIT Rotch Library staff for access to materials. I am especially indebted to Mary Daniels, chief archivist of the Francis Loeb Library, Harvard Graduate School of Design, for her invaluable help. Many images in this article are courtesy of the Loeb Library. I would like to thank Mr. Hisham Munir for the use of his images.

[3] For an analysis and summary of Frank Lloyd Wright's Baghdad, see Mina Marefat, "Wright's Baghdad," in *Frank Lloyd Wright, Europe and Beyond*, edited by Anthony Alofsin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); idem, "Baghdad Dans les Annees 50, Les Dessins de Frank Lloyd Wright," *Beaux Art Magazine,* October 2003: 68–73. See also Marefat, "Bauhaus in Baghdad: Walter Gropius Master Project for Baghdad University," *DOCOMO* 35 (2006): 78–86. The National Endowment of the Humanities has supported further research and preparation of a book manuscript. Current research on Wright and Gropius will be published in the catalog for a 2008 exhibition in Barcelona.

[4] British-trained Rifat Chadirji worked for the Development Board's technical division beginning in 1952 and went on to build a successful international practice. He clearly recalls working with the Jawdats and others on a successful lobbying effort in behalf of international architects, including most of those eventually invited to build. See Marefat, "1950s Baghdad." Mohamad Makiya, like Chadirji and Madhloom, educated in England, was among the young architects involved in designing new buildings.

[5] Many thanks to Nizar and Ellen Jawdat, Hisham Munir, Rifat Chadirji, and Mohamad Makiya for multiple interviews. Their contribution to Baghdad's architectural development is commendable.

[6] Author's interview with Chadirji, 2007; I am grateful to Mr. Chadirji whom I first queried about this subject in 1997. Chadirji's young colleague Kahtan Awni had studied architecture in California.

[7] Siegfried Giedion, *Walter Gropius, Work and Teamwork* (New York: Reinhold, 1954), p. 17. Giedion was a chief Gropius propagandist. For a comprehensive biography, see Reginald R. Isaacs, *Walter Gropius Der Mensch und sein Werk*, Volume 1 (Berlin: Mann Verlag, 1983) and Volume 2 (Berlin: Mann Verlag, 1984). For a shorter English edition, see idem, *Gropius, an Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus* (Boston, Toronto, London: Little Brown and Company, 1991).

[8] Doreen Ehrlich, *The Bauhaus* (Lombard: Mallard Press 1991), p. 10. Much has been published on the history and origins of the Bauhaus. See, for example, Magdalena Droste and Bauhaus Archiv, *Bauhaus: 1919–1933* (Berlin: Taschen, 1990).

[9] While the influence of the Bauhaus education model championed by Gropius radically transformed Western architectural education in the twentieth century, its impact in the Middle East is not yet fully explored. Baghdad University is perhaps the most tangible example, one that extended beyond architectural education insofar as concepts of teamwork and collaboration across disciplines were applied to the entire university.

[10] Ellen and Nizar Jawdat, interviews with the author. John Harkness, a founder of TAC, credits the Jawdats for the Baghdad commission; see John Harkness, *The Walter Gropius Archives*, Volume 4, *1945–1969* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1969), p. 189. The Gropius-Jawdat friendship is well documented by Ellen Jawdat's correspondence with Ise and Walter Gropius through the 1960s.

[11] Harvard University Houghton Library, bms Ger 208 (956) undated typed letter with heading, "Baghdadis."

[12] Henry Wiens, "Balanced and Integrated," in *Iraq Progresses* (Baghdad, Iraq, 1956, no page numbers). The book is structured as a propaganda publication with many advertisements showing projects completed or underway with the king and other dignitaries inaugurating or visiting various sites, many of them involving American universities.

[13] Letter from Ellen Jawdat, 3 October 1954. Bms Ger 208 folder 956 Houghton Library, manuscripts and unpublished letters from the Gropius file. Hereafter, references to letters from this collection will cite the writer, recipient, and date.

[14] Ellen Jawdat to Walter Gropius, 3 October 1954.

[15] MIT Rotch Library, Gropius/TAC Archives. Gropius had considerable help from the Jawdats and their connections in developing contract language. Nizar Jawdat interview with author, February 2008.

[16] Nizar Jawdat introduced Gropius to this partner firm in Baghdad; author's interview, February 2007.

[17] Hisham Munir interview with author, August 2007. He continued his association with TAC from 1959 to 1990. Munir had returned to Iraq in 1957 after studying architecture first at the University of Texas, Austin, and then at the University of Southern California. Medhat Ali Madhloom was an influential architect who was introduced to Gropius by the Jawdats. After the death of Madhloom the firm became Hisham Munir and Associates. Munir was among the active young architects and original founders of the School of Architecture in the University of Baghdad. He was actively engaged in both practice and academic work throughout a very productive career, joint venturing from 1980–86 with Canadian architect Arthur Erickson.

[18] To reduce problems of distance, TAC also established offices in Rome, working there with project engineers Panero, Weidlinger, and Salvadori to complete the working drawings. The international office was a tactic TAC introduced into corporate architectural practice. Nizar Jawdat encouraged the base in Italy.

[19] Ellen Jawdat to Ise Gropius, May 1958.

[20] Nizar Jawdat to Walter Gropius, 4 October 1958.

[21] Ise Gropius to the Jawdats, 29 September 1958.

[22] Walter Gropius, "Planning the University of Baghdad," *Architectural Record*, February 1961: 119. The article's title page listed: "In charge, Walter Gropius, Robert S. McMillan, Louis A. McMillen; Associates, Richard Brooker, H. Morse Payne, Jr. and the structural and mechanical engineers, Panero Weidlinger-Salvadori, SA."

[23] Ibid. H. Morse Payne notes that he never saw Gropius draw. I am grateful for his July 2006 interviews with me and his insights into Gropius as an architect and TAC's methods. Unlike many TAC principals, Payne was not a Harvard student. He was a graduate of the Boston Architectural Society.
[24] Louis McMillen, 6 April 1989, "Notes for Gropius Book," p. 7. TAC and Gropius files, Harvard University Graduate School of Design Archives.
[25] Payne interview with author, July 2006.
[26] "Planning a University," *The Christian Science Monitor,* 2 April 1958: 9.
[27] Walter Gropius, "TAC, the University of Baghdad," *Architectural Record*, April 1959: 148. The article printed a full page of Gropius' own description of the project.
[28] Ibid.
[29] McMillen, "Notes," p. 6.
[30] Ernesto Rogers, "Architecture of the Middle East," *Casabella* 242, August 1960: vii.
[31] Payne, interview 2006.
[32] Payne, interview 2006. "Organic" in the Bauhaus vocabulary at this time apparently described design features less rigidly orthogonal, more amorphous. It was different from Frank Lloyd Wright's use of the term.
[33] Gropius, "TAC," p. 148.
[34] Gropius, "Planning," p. 108.
[35] Gropius, "Planning," p. 109.
[36] Gropius, "Planning," p. 110. Thus, the central part of the campus was designed to be pedestrian only.
[37] Gropius, "Planning," p. 121.
[38] Rogers, "Architecture," p. 1.
[39] Gropius, "TAC," p. 148.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] McMillen, "Notes," pp. 2, 6.
[43] Likewise, TAC's reach had apparently expanded into Mosul. In 1966, Ellen Jawdat notes that "We went with Persis and Louis [McMillen] to Mosul ... and were impressed by the beautiful city you have for the university." Ellen Jawdat to Ise and Walter Gropius, 9 May 1966.
[44] Giulio Carlo Argan, "The University of Baghdad, by The Architects Collaborative International, a Town for Scholarship," *Casabella* 242, August 1960: 1–31.
[45] Gropius, "Planning," p. 108
[46] Rogers, "Architecture," p. 242.
[47] McMillen, "Notes," p. 8.
[48] *The Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq*, a government sponsored publication prominently featured the building in its second issue published in August 1960, pp. 5–12.
[49] Ibid., p. 5.
[50] Ibid., p. 11.
[51] *Bulletin of the Republic* July 1961: 11.
[52] Ellen Jawdat to Walter Gropius, 14 January 1955. The plans for CIAM in Baghdad were never realized.
[53] Ellen Jawdat to Ise and Walter Gropius, 19 September 1964.
[54] Ellen Jawdat to Ise Gropius, 11 August 1967.

Differentiated Regional Development in Iraq, Natali (continued from page 1)

delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

Indeed, maintaining the status quo may be advantageous in the short term, but the costs of non-recognition and commitment to Iraqi sovereignty have impeded the full development potential of the Kurdistan region. The main emphasis of the U.S.-led democracy mission has been to reconnect the Kurdistan region to Iraq and not to strengthen its political institutions. Further, foreign investors are generally wary of doing business in quasi-state environments in which contracts are not legally binding. The Kurdistan region may have arranged a direct petroleum drilling venture with foreign businesses; however, the vast majority of large companies refuse to negotiate with Arbil, despite the relative calm and economic prospects for growth in the region. Nor is there any real benefit of stalemate in Kirkuk, where the payoffs of territorial accession for the Kurdistan region are high. Most Kurds regard Baghdad as a political and economic liability, impeding the implementation of Article 140 and the KRG's potential access to Kirkuk and the Iraqi strategic pipeline.

Still, the benefits of stalemate have had a significant impact on the Kurdish economy, which has gradually become better than the failed Iraqi central state it is still part of, by producing positive externalities for its perpetrators, including wealth generated from aid programs, customs revenues, and illicit trading. With little interest in implementing agreements such as revenue or resource sharing, or as part of prolonged disputes, key political elites in Arbil and Baghdad have important incentives to keep the KRG linked — even in discrete ways — to the weak central government. Kurdish political-economic entrepreneurs have used international aid to create and support parallel economies by controlling currencies, goods, and services passing through the region and linked to Iraqi reconstruction.

Aid-generated development has also encouraged the emergence of a more complex political economy. With the termination of the international sanctions regime and internal embargo, the region has expanded trade relations and re-assumed its role as a transit zone. Increasing economic interdependence has encouraged, if not demanded, political compromise with regional states and Baghdad. Turkey has important investments in the Kurdistan region and the majority share of foreign businesses. From 2003 to 2007 the value of bilateral trade between Turkey and Iraq, nearly all of which passes through the Kurdish transit zone, increased from

940 million to 3.5 billion, and is expected to increase to twenty billion by 2010.[4] Similarly, important commercial relations have developed between the Kurdish quasi-state and Iran. Of one hundred and twenty Iranian companies in the Kurdistan region, about eighty are working in Suleymaniya province and have an important share of the market trade in housing and food materials. Foreign companies have responded to the KRG's investment incentives by penetrating local markets and establishing operations in the region. By December 2008, European, American, and South Korean companies negotiated over twenty oil contracts with the KRG valued at about ten billion in investment in the Kurdistan region. These companies include the American oil conglomerate, Hunt, and the South Korean government's national oil company.

Important linkages also have emerged between the Kurdistan region and the central government, challenging the notion of a Kurdish quasi-state apart from Baghdad. As a transit zone the Kurdistan region has become a vital link to Iraqi trade, creating financial opportunities for the growing construction and contracting sectors. Dohuk governorate continues to supply Mosul and other regions with goods and focuses on Baghdad for future business and marketing activities. Kurdish chambers of commerce encourage wealthy Iraqi businessmen in Jordan and Syria to invest in the Kurdistan region "because it is Iraq."[5] In 2006, the Warka Bank established by the Boniya family from Baghdad created branches in all three Kurdish governorates.

One can argue that the economic benefits of stalemate have failed to address unresolved political issues, allowing tensions to continue or strengthen between the Kurdish quasi-state and the central government. The TAL and the Iraqi constitution have authorized power and revenue sharing; however, political trust and a mutual commitment to federalism have not emerged. The central government, under the auspices of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its successor regimes failed to establish an effective system of direction and coordination between the regions. It gave various organizations and offices responsibility for different aspects of the eighteen governorates in Iraq, which impeded concerted action or efforts to mediate conflicts.[6]

Consequently, despite U.S. government-sponsored events and specific meetings between Kurdish and Iraqi officials, ministries in Arbil and Baghdad have no significant contact with one another. Even when two of four of the Ministers of Industry in Baghdad were Kurds (Mohammed Towfiq and Fawzi Hawrimi), or Iraqi ministries had Kurdish deputy-ministers, there was no real cooperation between the KRG and Iraqi central government. New conflicts also have emerged over the constitution, and in particular, over implementing key articles relating to finance and resource sharing. Different Iraqi communities are calling for amendments to certain points dealing with petroleum revenues (Article 14); however, the KRG has refused any changes.

Socio-cultural contacts between regions have also been frustrated by the security situation in southern and central Iraq. Internal security checks in the Kurdistan region often require the scrutiny of non-Kurdish communities, particularly Arabs, which has intensified sentiments of distrust, while discouraging travel between the northern region and southern and central Iraq. In fact, the forced isolation that characterized the relationship between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad in previous periods has become voluntary isolation. Ongoing political instability in Baghdad offers the Kurdistan region little incentive to remain part of the failing Iraqi state.

Despite these evident distinctions, traditional relationships have been sustained while new types of linkages have emerged. As part of a federal Iraq, the Kurdistan region is bound to the Arabic language from an administrative, legal, and political perspective. Federal laws, the constitution, and official correspondences between Arbil and Baghdad are written in Arabic and translated into Kurdish. Lawyers and judges in the region are required to read Arabic and interpret legal texts. Local populations in the landlocked Kurdistan region will need to communicate in Arabic (as well as Turkish and Persian) to engage in business, diplomatic, and professional activities in the regional and national political economies. Further, many Iraqi Kurds are bound to the Arabic language for religious and cultural reasons; Arabic is employed in the mosques in Iraqi Kurdistan and for Islamic holidays and events. It is also used by Chaldo-Assyrians from Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra (alongside Chaldani), who have migrated to the Kurdistan region and participate in conferences and activities sponsored by its Christian groups. In fact, Badini speakers in Dohuk often prefer to speak Arabic than Sorani Kurdish, despite the attempts to standardize and Latinize the Kurdish language.

Politically, since 2003 the Kurdish elites have compromised their nationalist agenda for the region's long-term development needs. Instead of talking about a free Kurdistan as they did in the early post-Gulf War period, Kurdish leaders have emphasized Kurdish autonomy in a federal Iraq. Absence of a self-sustaining economy also leaves the Kurdistan region highly dependent upon Baghdad and regional states for its survival. Whereas during the pre-2003 period KRG revenues were based upon humanitarian aid and illegal customs taxes, after 2003 about ninety-five percent of its income is derived from the central government, seventy-five

percent of which is allocated to public sector salaries. Withdrawal of this support without any alternative source of autonomous income generation would cripple the Kurdish economy and instigate socio-political tensions.

Resource inequalities also demand compromises by Iraqi Kurds, who must choose between electricity and independence. Even though the KRG is constructing power plants in the northern region, it still receives and provides water and electricity to the central government, while depending upon Turkey to meet additional electricity demands. The KRG Ministry of Electricity often has to negotiate with Baghdad to get the region's fair allocation of power, which is based on the seasonal flow of water from the two dams in the Kurdistan region (Dokan and Darbandikan).

Similarly, despite the Kurdistan region's autonomy in negotiating oil contracts and the potential wealth apart from Baghdad, the possibilities for an independent Kurdish economy are compromised by the highly politicized nature of petroleum in Iraq. Baghdad has nullified the contracts, blacklisted all involved companies and threatened to sanction the KRG. Indeed, the KRG has ignored the threats, expects to sign twenty additional contracts in the year ahead, and is preparing to create a network of pipelines linking existing and future oil wells in the Kurdistan region via the strategic pipeline in Kirkuk. A new pipeline is also planned to be built from Taq Taq to Zakho as an alternative means to export Kurdish crude from Iraq to the Ceyhan port in Turkey.

Even then, the nature of the landlocked region, international law, and the logistics of transporting petroleum out of Iraq will demand compromises with the Iraqi central government and Turkey over oil exploration, revenue-sharing, pipeline tariff income, and Kurdish autonomy. In particular, the Turkish government refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the KRG or the Kurdish leadership and will only negotiate with Baghdad regarding petroleum, pipelines, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), further undermining the political maneuverability of the KRG. Consequently, while Baghdad currently has no power or direct authority in the Kurdistan region, it has become the link between the KRG and Turkey. Kurdish officials have suggested the creation of a High Council for Petroleum to supervise all oil fields in Iraq, which would require direct coordination between Arbil and Baghdad.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings have implications for Iraqi state building and Kurdish nationalist projects. They reveal that the emergence and sustainability of the Kurdish quasi-state is more complex than symbolic myth-making and the will of the people to be apart from the weak Iraqi state. Rather, Kurdish nationalist sentiment coexists with the "benefits of stalemate:" economic development, recognition, and legitimacy derived from international support. These benefits are tied to the sovereign regime and the nature of foreign assistance, which check the emergence of a self-sufficient and highly autonomous quasi-state. The very nature of the foreign aid regime assures that the Kurdistan region will remain part of a federal Iraq and that it will not become "too autonomous." Ongoing dependency upon external patronage and lucrative commercial opportunities limit the possibility of Kurdish independence while increasing the need for negotiation with the central government and regional states.

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[1] The Kurdistan region includes those territories administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the governorates of Suleymaniya, Dohuk, and Arbil. Negotiations between the KRG and the Iraqi central government are underway to decide jurisdiction of disputed territories inside the present-day governorates of Kirkuk, Nineva (Mosul), Diyala, and Wasit (Kut). They are "disputed" because they have been subjected to changes in internal boundaries, administrative units, resources, and demographics as part of the central government's larger Arabization program.

[2] Quasi-states refer to those political entities that have internal but not external sovereignty. They are part of a failed state or an outcome of unfair post-imperial boundary markers. External sovereignty is not acquired through de jure status, but rather, by international recognition provided by the international community. See Pšl. Kolsto, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," *Journal of Peace Research* 43.6 (2006): 23–40; Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics* 53 (2001): 524–52.

[3] The 2005 Iraqi constitution granted the KRG an annual capital investment budget of seventeen percent of the federal budget, which increased from 2.5 billion to seven billion U.S.D. annually from 2005–2008 (after deductions, about thirteen percent). The three provincial councils in the Kurdistan region also have received special funds from the Advanced Development Provincial Reconstruction (ADPR) budget, which has increased from 2006 to 2008 from 130 to 395 million USD.

[4] Denise Natali, "The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Third World Quarterly* 28.6 (2007): 1111–29.

[5] Interview with Ayad A. Abdulhakim, Chairman, Dohuk Chamber of Commerce, Dohuk, 3 January 2008.

[6] Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), pp. 102–03.

THE RIGIDITY OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE FALL OF IRAQ'S MONARCHY

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In examining the almost four decades of monarchical rule one is struck that the notion of the "circulation of elites" so vital for vibrant political structures hardly existed in Iraq. While the average life span of Iraqi cabinets was a mere five and a half months, the names and faces of the occupants of cabinet ministries changed little. This was particularly true of the pivotal portfolios — the premiership, defense, interior, foreign affairs and finance, where over fifty percent in the entire monarchical period were held by no more than fourteen men.[1] This concentration of political power was most apparent in the office of prime minister. Thus, for example, of the forty-eight cabinets between 1930 and 1958, twenty-one were headed by two men: Nurī al-Saʿīd fourteen times and Jamīl al-Madfaʿī the remaining seven.[2] Men who were members of the political and military entourage of King Faysal I during World War I were still holding sway over the political fortunes of Iraq in 1958.

Whatever elite circulation there was occurred within the very top of the societal strata and rarely extended downward. More damaging was the excruciatingly slow pace with which the younger generation from within the ranks of the top stratum itself would be granted entry into the seemingly exclusive domain of the top policy-making elite. A few members of the governing elite did create political parties that could have become channels for generational change, but these organizations were tied tightly to the personality and policies of the leader. Membership bestowed access and the opportunity to maintain the privileged status quo, but not the capacity to influence, let alone change, policies or modify political practices. Joining Nurī's party, for example, was for the majority of members simply a quick route to personal gain, to an undeserved promotion or to a much sought after relationship with a foreign company. Cementing the status quo was the operational code of these parties; it was not just that debate, efforts at reform, or voicing the slightest skepticism were not tolerated — these were not even contemplated. Opposition was left to the opposition parties, who participated in the decision-making process on very rare occasions, and usually for periods so short that any impact on policy was negligible.

Nurī al-Saʿīd, who literally defined the politics of the era, was probably the biggest culprit. To begin with, he had been the dominant political personality for so long that, according to a protégé of his, he treated Iraq as "a father would treat a child: take personal charge of his upbringing, look after his welfare, and discipline him when necessary."[3] This paternal attitude, necessarily dismissive of youth, was fortified by Nurī's mistrust of change, which contributed to his unwillingness to effect a generational transformation. This frustrated even the British, his most ardent admirers. As early as 1943, the British Ambassador, despairing of the rigidity of Nurī and the "old gang," tried to alert Prince ʿAbd al-Ilāh to the stagnation of the ruling elite and "the need for introducing new blood, otherwise peoples' discontent might take violent forms."[4] A decade and a half later, the Ambassador's fears would be realized, not least because the recommended transfusion of new blood was at best perfunctory. While Nurī consulted with the British Embassy regularly and was known to take the counsel of the Ambassador and his government seriously, he did not budge on his proclivity for dependence on old and trusted faces.

The old and trusted faces were not limited to the closely knit ruling circle; it extended to the leaders of tribes and other feudal lords who, because of their economic interests, were symbiotically tied to the Palace and the old politicians. Legislation favoring the sheikhs testified to the political power of the landowning class. The sheikhs used their parliamentary representation, which in the 1950s never fell under thirty-five percent,[5] to their advantage in the legislation of laws. This led to the widespread belief that governments simply did the sheikhs' bidding.[6] And indeed that perception was hardly far from the truth. Thus, all efforts to create a regularized agricultural property tax were sabotaged by the sheikhs through their presence in parliament and alliance with the ruling elites. When a number of parliamentarians urged the Regent to intervene on the issues of property taxes and land reform, he responded with not a little irony that parliamentarians kept telling him of his growing unpopularity in the cities, so if that were true, then why would he turn the countryside against him too?[7]

The Regent was particularly sensitive, even beholden, to the sheikhs and their demands and interests. Following the riots of 1952, Prince ʿAbd al-Ilāh appointed a military government under the premiership of General Nūr al-Dīn Mahmud to restore order. In the process, however, he insisted that the agriculture portfolio should be given to Ḥajj Raiḥ al-ʿAṭṭiya, a sheikh of a large southern tribe, whom the prince counted as a loyal supporter, but who happened to be barely literate.[8] In the

perception of ʿAbd al-Ilāh and the old politicians, such committed defenders of the monarchical order were increasingly hard to come by in urban areas during the turbulent 1950s. In 1954 the Minister of Finance, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿUzrī, introduced a new taxation bill for agricultural lands and a fairer distribution of land among the sheikhs and peasants. ʿAbd al-Ilāh invited the tribal sheikhs to a meeting with al-ʿUzrī at the Palace, whereupon they threatened to use arms to stop the implementation of the bill. While their belligerent response irritated the Prince, he nevertheless took their side, privately explaining to al-ʿUzrī that public interest would not be served by angering and alienating the sheikhs since they represented an important, even crucial, pillar of the political order. "We depend on them," the Prince concluded, "to stop the revolutionary tides that threaten the security and stability of the country."[9] And when the Prime Minister, Fāḍil al-Jamālī, took up the cause of his Finance Minister with the Prince, he too was summarily rebuffed.

The British Embassy, in fact, had for some time advocated a radical reform of the laws relating to socio-economic conditions among the tribal holdings, including new taxes on feudal landowners and a more equitable redistribution of land. But ʿAbd al-Ilāh, backed by Nurī al-Saʿīd, stood steadfast against British pressure arguing that they could not afford to lose the support of the sheikhs, increasingly the only significant segment of society that was unbendingly committed to the monarchical order.[10] In the post-World War II period, as turbulent times were sweeping not just Iraq but the region, the old politicians and the Palace found solace in an ever narrowing societal support base of familiar segments of the social strata at the expense of a broader social milieu that included a rapidly expanding and influential, yet increasingly alienated, urban middle class. Sharing in the same patriarchical authoritarian beliefs brought the rulers and tribal sheikhs into a symbiotic partnership. The sheikhs' application of their rigid authoritarian structures in their tribal domains, cemented by laws that transformed the peasants into serfs in almost everything but name,[11] was in many ways a microcosm of what ʿAbd al-Ilāh, Nurī, and the old politicians wished they could (and indeed tried to) impose on the country as a whole.

Governance in Iraq emerged not out of the interactions of multiple institutions, but of the political dominance of a narrow elite that was bound by a rigid and exclusivist definition of its interest and well being. Within the parameters of such a definition, however, petty squabbles would exist, indeed abound. It was perhaps to the misfortune of the monarchy that in the most volatile decade of its life, the 1950s, the most significant rivalry among the top policy makers was the one that existed between Nurī al-Saʿīd and ʿAbd al-Ilāh.

At the core of the complex, often troubled, relationship was Nurī's determination to be the sole gatekeeper of everything political in Iraq. His long years of service, his frequent occupation of the office of prime minister, and his broad network of strategic allies and cronies, bestowed upon him, he fervently believed, a position of centrality and political dominance above that of the other politicians. ʿAbd al-Ilāh, on the other hand, younger and less shrewd, but fortified by the powers of the Royal prerogative, would try on a number of occasions to clip Nurī's wings. Thus at times he would pointedly bypass Nurī's advice and seek the counsel of other politicians, most of whom after all were as seasoned as Nurī. But even such a small matter would be considered by Nurī as a scornful insult and a measured slap in the face.[12] On a more serious political level, ʿAbd al-Ilāh would confide to friends and to the British his concern over Nurī's monopoly over the policy-making structure and process.[13] He would thus try from time to time to loosen Nurī's grip by entrusting the government to some of those he considered his allies. Nurī would respond by creating a governmental crisis through instructing his supporters in parliament to sabotage the workings of the existing government.

A revealing instance of this tug of war occurred in 1954. ʿAbd al-Ilāh asked his ally Arshad al-ʿUmarī to form a government, and recognizing the predominance in parliament of Hizb al-Ittiḥād al-Dustūrī, Nurī's party, he dissolved parliament and called for a new election. While the new elections did not break Nurī's hold over the institution, ʿAbd al-Ilāh was able to bring many of his supporters into the new parliament. Nurī still had a majority, but a considerably reduced one. By the time the elections had taken place, Nurī had already left the country in a huff, traveling to Britain for ostensibly medical reasons. In London, however, Nurī convinced the Foreign Office that British vital interests would be jeopardized by his exclusion from power, an argument he did not have to make too strongly to his British friends and admirers. These were turbulent times; there were escalating fears of a Soviet penetration in the area and of a disquieting upsurge in anti-British nationalist fervor. Britain needed its trusted "strong man" at the helm and would convey this sentiment in no uncertain terms to the Prince.[14] In Baghdad, Khalīl Kanna, Nurī's trusted protégé, under instructions from his mentor, would use Nurī's parliamentary majority to frustrate governmental policies, prompting ʿAbd al-Ilāh to summon Kanna to the Palace and tell him to his face that "much as he has tried to like him, he simply could not."[15] Having been completely outmaneuvered, the Prince had to swallow his pride and fly to Paris to meet with Nurī al-Saʿīd and accept all the conditions that were laid

out by the wily old politician.[16] In an increasingly volatile region, radicalized by the nationalist onslaught and cold war machinations, the constant tension between the two most powerful political personalities did little to cement the political order in the face of gathering political storms.

The troubled relationship between Nurī and ʿAbd al-Ilāh was anything but unique; it was in fact a microcosm of the kind of relationships that existed among the old politicians generally. Fueled mostly by personal rivalry and political greed rather than honest ideational or public policy disagreements, these squabbles, petty though they might have been, would lead to political stagnation within the cabinet, and on a number of occasions precipitate the fall of governments.[17] A British Ambassador would write in despairing tones to the Foreign Office that repeated governmental crises were the result of "the inability of ministers to put the national interest ahead of their personal rivalries."[18] While this ambassadorial lamentation was written in the 1940s, it in fact reflected an institutional frailty that characterized the entirety of the monarchical period right through to its end in July 1958.

One of its most dysfunctional consequences was the military's intrusion into the political process, which ultimately was to seal the fate of the monarchy. The practice of using the army to unseat rival politicians started in earnest in the mid-1930s when members of the Ikhāʾ Party conspired with military officers to overthrow the government of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī. While the populist Ikhaʾ had genuine differences with the dictatorial Hāshimī, the entire ploy was driven by Ḥikmat Sulaymān, whose objection to Hāshimī had more to do with settling personal scores than with ideational differences.[19] It was the same Sulaymān who, a year earlier, had conspired with tribal sheikhs to overthrow the government of ʿAlī Jawdat al-Ayyubī.[20] Even Jaʿfar Abū al-Timmān, known for his decency and lofty ideals, would be driven to collaborate with the army to unseat the recalcitrant Hāshimī.[21] And in one of those gruesome historical ironies, Nurī al-Saʿīd, whose body was mutilated by an angry mob in the wake of the 1958 military coup, was one of the first politicians to use the army to achieve his own political ends in the second half of the 1930s.[22] Indeed, he was the darling of the "Golden Square,"[23] the four army officers who literally controlled the direction of Iraqi politics in the late 1930s and ended up plunging the country in a preposterous war with Britain in 1941.

That war sidelined the army for the next few years, and its capacity to act was severely curtailed by the political leadership, especially the Regent. But its position and status began to improve in the late 1940s when the politicians found a new role for it. As nationalism swept through the region, gripping the hearts and emotions of a new generation increasingly alienated from the old politicians and their British backers, ʿAbd al-Ilāh and other members of the ruling elite looked to the army to maintain public order. In the popular insurrections of 1952 and 1956, public order was restored only through the imposition of martial law and the introduction of army units into the streets. While the army would "save" the monarchical order in these instances, in the long term, every such event would heighten the army's appetite for political power and control, and thus constituted simply another nail in the monarchy's ultimate coffin.

What is strange was that while one or two of the politicians would caution against too much reliance on the military, the ruling group as a whole seemed pretty sanguine about the army's loyalty. Nurī was absolutely certain of the loyalty of the military to the throne and the existing political order, and would angrily dismiss any suggestions to the contrary.[24] Nor was the Palace otherwise persuaded. In one meeting in 1954, ʿAbd al-Ilāh told an Egyptian minister, who had been a senior member of the army putsch which toppled King Faruk in Egypt two years earlier, that contrary to the troubled relationship that existed between Faruk and his army, Iraqi officers were loyal to the Hashemite monarchy. He listed the many benefits that the officers enjoyed: they were given villas, their pensions were generous, and they received a full year's salary as a bonus on retirement. ʿAbd al-Ilāh's conclusion was that the military putsch in Egypt would not be emulated in Iraq.[25] Indeed, a few days before Iraq's own military coup of July 14, 1958, King Ḥusayn of Jordan learned through his intelligence services of the conspiracy and the impending insurrection. Not only did he have the details, but also the names of the main conspirators. The Palace in Baghdad dispatched the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to ʿAmmān. But the latter remained unmoved, looking "politely bored" at the recital of evidence. Before taking his leave, he assured the Jordanian King that "the Iraqi army was built on tradition [and was] generally considered the best in the Middle East." If anyone should be concerned about the loyalty of his army, the Iraqi general concluded, it should be King Husayn himself.[26]

That the ruling elite would be so cavalier while rumors of plots and conspiracies abounded was a testament to the political and cognitive isolation of the Palace, Nurī, and the other politicians from the country, which by the summer of 1958 had reached chronic proportions. It was left to the men in military uniform, who had been called upon so many times before to re-stabilize the ship of state that they were bound to develop a voracious appetite for power, to deliver the deadly blow to the monarchy and its men on July 14, 1958.

[1] See the table detailing the distribution of pivotal cabinet ministries between 1920 and 1958 in ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Ḥamid Rashīd, *al-ʿIrāq al-Muʿāṣir* (*Contemporary Iraq*) (Damascus: al-Mada Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 120–21.

[2] See the table for the full fifty-nine cabinets in the monarchical era in ʿAqīl al-Nāṣirī, *al-Jaysh wa al-Ṣulta fī al-ʿIrāq al-Malakī, 1921–1958* (*The Army and the Political Authority in Monarchical Iraq, 1921–1958*) (Damascus, Syria: al-Hassad for Publishing and Distribution, 2000), pp. 214–16.

[3] Khalīl Kanna, *al-ʿIrāq: Amsuhu wa Ghadduhu* (*Iraq: Its Yesterday and Tomorrow*) (Beirut: no publisher, 1966), pp. 317–18.

[4] Mudhaffar ʿAbd Allāh al-Amīn, *Jamāʿat al-Ahalī: Mansha'uha, ʿAqīdatuha, wa Dawruha fī al-Siyāsa al-ʿIrāqiya, 1932–1946* (*The Ahali Group: Its Origins, Its Ideology and Its Role in Iraqi Politics, 1932–1946*) (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-ʿArabiyya li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 2001), p. 149.

[5] Ibid., p. 103. In another authoritative publication, the figure is put considerably higher at forty-five percent, perhaps because large landowners who were not necessarily tribal sheikhs were counted. See Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, second edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), p. 78.

[6] See, for example, the bitter denunciation of the government of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in February 1950 by a member of the opposition, deriding it as no different from earlier governments in "believing in feudalism and supporting tribal influence." Aḥmad Fawzī, *al-Muthīr min Aḥdāth al-ʿIrāq al-Siyāsiya* (*The Sensational in Iraqi Political Events*) (Baghdad: Dar al-Huriya li al-Tibāʿa, 1988), p. 90.

[7] Rashīd, *al-ʿIrāq al-Muʿāṣir,* p. 127.

[8] ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Hasanī, *Tārīkh al-Wizārāt al-ʿIrāqiya*, al-Juz' al-Thāmin (*History of Iraqi Cabinets*, Volume 8) (Baghdad: Dar al-Shu'ūn al-Thaqāfiya al-ʿĀmma, 1988), p. 331, note 1.

[9] ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿUzrī, *Tārīkh fī Dhikrayāt al-ʿIrāq, 1930–1958*, al-Juz' al-Awwal (*History in Memories of Iraq, 1930–1958*, Volume 1) (Beirut: Markaz al-Abjadiya li al-Ṣaff al-Taṣwīrī, 1982), pp. 454–57.

[10] ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Khumasī, *al-Amīr ʿAbd al-Ilāh, 1939–1958: Dirāsa Tārīkhiya Siyāsiyya* (*Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah, 1939–1958: A Political Historical Study*) (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-ʿArabiyya li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 2001), p. 353.

[11] Ismāʿīl al-ʿĀrif, *Asrār Thawrat 14 Tammūz wa Ta'sīs al-Jumhūriya fī al-ʿIrāq* (*The Secrets of the July 14 Revolution and the Creation of the Republic in Iraq*) (London: Al-Majid, 1986), p. 215; Ḥusayn Jamīl, *al-ʿIrāq al-Jadīd* (*The New Iraq*) (Beirut: Dar Munaymana li al-Tibāʿa wa al-Nashr, 1958), p. 25.

[12] Al-ʿUzrī, *Tārīkh fī Dhikrayāt al-ʿIrāq*, p. 426.

[13] Salmān al-Tikrītī, *al-Waṣṣī ʿAbd al-Ilāh bin ʿAlī Yabḥath ʿAn ʿArsh, 1939–1953* (*The Regent ʿAbd al-Ilah bin ʿAli Searches for a Crown, 1939–1953*) (Beirut: al-Dar al-ʿArabiyya li al-Mawsuʿāt, 1989), pp. 177–79.

[14] Taghrīd ʿAbd al-Zahrāʿ Rashīd, *al-Bilāṭ al-Malakī al-ʿIrāqī fī al-Sanawāt al-Multahiba, 1953–1958* (*The Iraqi Royal Palace in the Inflamed Years*) (Beirut: Dar Sādir, 2004), p. 54.

[15] Kanna, *al-ʿIrāq*, p. 262.

[16] For the details of the meeting in Paris, see Kamāl Mudhhir Aḥmad, *Mudhākarat Ahmad Mukhtār Baban, Ākhir Ra'īs li al-Wuzarāʿ fī al-ʿAhd al-Malaki fī al-ʿIrāq* (*The Memoirs of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, the Last Prime Minister in the Monarchical Era in Iraq*) (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-ʿArabiyya li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 1999), pp. 63–71.

[17] Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900–1950: A Political, Social and Economic History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 395.

[18] Al-Amīn, *Jamāʿat al-Ahalī*, p. 144.

[19] ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hasanī, *Tārīkh al-Wizārāt al-ʿIrāqiya*, al-Juz' al-Rābiʿ (*The History of Iraqi Cabinets*, Volume 4) (Baghdad: Dar al-Shu'ūn al-Thāqāfiyya al-ʿĀmma, 1988), p. 208.

[20] Muḥsin Abū Ṭabīkh, *al-Mabādi' wa al-Rijāl: Bawādir al-Inhiyār al-Siyāsī fī al-ʿIrāq* (*Principles and Men: Symptoms of Political Collapse in Iraq*) (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-ʿArabiyya li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 2003), pp. 80–81.

[21] Khālid al-Timmimi, *Jaʿfar Abū al-Timman: Dirāsa fī al-Zaʿāma al-Siyāsiya al-ʿIrāqiya* (*Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman: A Study in Iraqi Political Leadership*) (Damascus: Dar al-Waraq li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 1996), pp. 330–47.

[22] Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh, *Fursān al-ʿUruba* (*Knights of Arabism*) (Damascus: no publisher, 1956), pp. 122–24.

[23] See Ismael al-ʿArif, *Asrar Thawrat 14 Tamuz*, p. 33.

[24] Al-ʿUzrī, *Tārīkh fī Dhikrayāt al-ʿIrāq*, pp. 375–76.

[25] Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 203.

[26] His Majesty, King Hussein I of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head: The Autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 195.

NEWSLETTER SUBMISSIONS, COMMENTS, & SUGGESTIONS

To submit articles, images, or announcements in either *English or Arabic*, please email Katie Johnson at katie@taarii.org for submission details. The deadline for the spring issue of the TAARII Newsletter is **December 1, 2008**.

For all other inquiries, comments, and suggestions, please visit our website, www.taarii.org.

SOCIAL SCIENCES IN IRAQ: A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

LUCINE TAMINIAN

This report was funded by the International Development Research Center, Canada, and conducted by Falih Abd al-Jabbar, Shirzad al-Najjar, Haider Saeed, Asma Jamil, Yihya al-Kubaysi, and Mahammad Atawan

The Social Sciences in Iraq recently have been the focus of several workshops and studies organized by national and international academic and research institutions. In 2005, TAARII held a two-day workshop in Amman that was attended by Iraqi and American scholars to discuss the future of Social Sciences and research in Iraq. Institut Français du Proche Orient, the French Institute for the Near East, also held a one-day workshop in Amman in April 2008 to discuss similar issues.

In 2007, the Institute of Strategic Studies, an Iraqi NGO, carried out a survey of Social Science departments in thirteen Iraqi universities. A team of eight researchers collected data on these departments and conducted interviews with a selected number of staff, students, and deans of departments. The survey covered universities in five geographical areas: 1) Baghdad (University of Baghdad, al-Mustansiriya University, and Nahrain University); 2) Kurdistan (Sulaymaniya University and Salahudin University in Arbil); 3) central area (University of Anbar, University of Tikrit, and University of Diyala); 4) Mid-Euphrates (University of Kufa, University of Karbala, and Qadisiya University); 5) South Iraq (University of Basra and Dhi Qar University).

There are twenty-two public universities, eighteen private universities (the majority of which were set up recently), and two foreign universities (an American University in Sulaymaniya and a British one in Arbil). Each of these faculty and departments in the Social Sciences.

The researchers adopt a comprehensive, but loose, definition of Social Sciences that comprises all disciplines not defined as natural and applied sciences or technology and includes sixteen disciplines. However, in my discussion I will focus on five fields: anthropology, sociology, economics, history, and political science.

The senior researchers organized a meeting in Amman to discuss the results of the survey published in a report. The meeting was attended by Iraqi university professors living in Amman, but who have experience teaching at Iraqi universities. The report studies the situation of Social Sciences in public universities in Iraq between the years 1996 and 2006, focusing on the various factors that have supposedly negative impacts on the Social Sciences, including political, institutional, and cultural factors.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Public Universities

The history of public higher education in Iraq goes back to the 1920s when the school of Law (1908) and Teachers' College (1923) were established to cater to the needs of the new nation state for qualified bureaucrats and school teachers. In 1957, the University of Baghdad was established, and was the only university in Iraq until the 1960s when, due to demographic changes and the growth of cities, the government decided to expand higher education.

The period from the 1960s to the 1980s witnessed the establishment of universities outside Baghdad. In 1964, two colleges were established as branches of the University of Baghdad, one in Basra in the south and the other

Table 4.1. Social Sciences in Iraqi Universities

University	*Sociology*	*Anthropology*	*History*	*Economics*	*Political Science*
Baghdad	X*	—	X	X	X
Mustansiriya	—	X	X	—	X
Nahrain	—	—	—	X	X
Sulaymaniya	X	—	X	X	—
Arbil	X	—	X	X	X
Anbar	X	—	X	X	—
Tikrit	—	—	X	X	X**
Diyala	—	—	X***	—	—
Kufa	—	—	X	X	—
Karbala	—	—	X***	X	—
Qadisiya	X	—	X***	X	—
Basra	—	—	X	X	X**
Dhi Qar	—	—	X	—	—

* Listed as Social Work and Is Part of the Department of Women's Education
** Part of Law Department
*** Part of Education Department

Table 4.2. Professors Who Graduated from Foreign Universities							
	U.S.	*West Europe*	*Russia and Eastern Europe*	*Asia*	*Iran*	*Arab Countries*	*Total*
Number of Professors	33.0	121.0	68.0	15.0	10.0	40.0	287
Percentage of Total	11.5	42.0	24.0	5.0	3.5	14.0	100.0%

in Mosul in the north. The two colleges became independent universities in 1967. Five more universities followed: Mustansiriya University College in Baghdad in 1963, University of Sulaymaniya in the north in 1969 (it was closed in 1982 and reopened in 1992), Salahudin University in Arbil in 1982, Kufa University in the south in 1987, and the University of Tikrit in 1988.

The 1991 war and the following years of sanctions harshly impacted university education in general and the quality of teaching, in particular. The number of foreign professors fell drastically. In 1990–1991, there were forty-four foreign and 146 Arab professors in the twelve universities in Iraq. The following year, there were only three foreign and eighty-eight Arab professors. At that time, a great number of highly qualified Iraqi professors immigrated to the West or to neighboring Arab countries. The Iraqi universities' scholarship program, whereby thousands of Iraqis were sent to graduate schools outside the country was discontinued because of the sanctions.

Iraqi universities therefore had to reproduce their own professors. New universities were set up in different parts of the country and most of the existing universities began to offer graduate studies. Admission to graduate programs was opened to all Iraqi undergraduate students who passed the English Language Entrance Exam with a minimum average of seventy percent. Starting in 1988, fifty percent of the seats in graduate schools were reserved for state employees.

The University of Anbar was established in 1990, the University of Babel in 1991, and three more universities in Baghdad: The University of Technology, Saddam University (now known as al-Nahrain University), and Saddam University for Islamic Sciences (now known as Islamic University). Seven more universities were set up later: three in the Mid-Euphrates area (Wasit, Karbala, Qadisiya), two in the center (Dhi Qar, Diyala), and one in the north (Kirkuk).

In Kurdistan, in addition to the two universities of Sulaymaniya and Salahudin, three more universities were founded after 1991: Dohuk University in 1992, University of Koya (Arbil) in 2003, and Hawler Medical University (Arbil) in 2005.

Public universities in Iraq are free and admission is open to all Iraqis who qualify for entry regardless of their social and economic circumstances. All students who pass the General Secondary Exam administered annually by the Ministry of Education are admitted.

Until 2003, higher education was centralized and the Ministry of Higher Education was responsible for planning and supervising all issues related to higher education, including the setting up of new universities and programs, scholarship and admission policies, curricula, salaries of teaching staff, etc. However, graduate schools had more say in planning their programs and graduation requirements.

Private Universities

Fifteen years after the nationalization of private universities in Iraq in 1973, three private university colleges were set up in Baghdad: University College of Heritage, al-Mansur University College, and al-Rafidain University College. The number of private universities increased greatly during the following two decades. There are now twenty private universities, ten of which are in the city of Baghdad, three in the city of Najaf and one in each of the cities of Basra, Mosul, Ramadi, Sulaymaniya, Baʿquba, Karbala, and Arbil.

Two foreign private universities were recently established in northern Iraq: a British University in Arbil in 2005 and an American one in Sulaymaniya in 2007. The language of instruction in these two universities is English.

SOCIAL SCIENCES

The first department of sociology in Iraq was developed in the 1950s in the University of Baghdad. It was the only Iraqi sociology department until the end of 1980s, when seven more departments were set up in the College of Arts at the Universities of Mosul, Babel, Anbar, Qadisiya, Wasit, Salahudin, and Sulaymaniya. History and economics are taught in the majority of the Social Science departments in the surveyed universities: political science and sociology in less than fifty percent of these universities, and anthropology in only one university (table 4.1).

According to the report, the Social Sciences in Iraqi universities had been impacted by a number of factors. As for political factors, state development plans and militarization policy implicitly favored natural sciences and technology, and funding and scholarship policies were supportive of these sciences. Moreover, the centralized government and economy constrained the Social Sciences both theoretically and methodologically. Subjects generally considered part and parcel of Social Sciences are not

taught because they are considered politically or socially threatening. For instance, ethnicity, gender, sociology of religion, ethnology, political anthropology, governance, comparative political systems, democracy, and authoritarianism were not taught in the departments of sociology, anthropology, or political science.

Second, the conservative Islamic movements, which have gained more power since 2003, have also put constraints on Social Science as part of their efforts to impose their conservative ideology on the university campuses.

Third, the Social Sciences are not highly valued in comparison to the applied sciences and technology (medicine, engineering, physics). Students who are not admitted to prestigious departments due to their low average in the general exam are usually admitted to the Social Science departments. The employment opportunities for Social Sciences, with the exception of some disciplines, such as international law or economics, are very limited.

Fourth, the departure of qualified Iraqi and foreign professors during the years of sanctions and times of insecurity impacted the quality of teaching in Iraqi universities, in general, and Social Sciences, in particular. At the time of the survey, there were only 287 professors of Social Sciences at universities of Baghdad, Basra, Salahudin, Sulaymaniya, and Anbar who had graduated from foreign universities, constituting only twelve percent of the total number of professors in these departments (table 4.2). The majority of these professors got their degrees from British universities (fifty-six), followed by those who received degrees in France (thirty-five), in the U.S. (thirty-three), in Russia (twenty-eight), and in Egypt (twenty-six). But the majority of Iraqi professors are cut off from recent theoretical and methodological developments in Social Sciences.

Most of the professors in these departments are fresh graduates and have limited experience in teaching at the university level. Between 63% to 70% of Social Science professors at the universities of Sulamaniya, Salahudin, and Anbar graduated after 2000. Moreover, 45% to 60% of the Social Science professors at the universities of Baghdad, Basra, Salahudin, Sulyamaniya, and Anbar have only a Masters of Science degree.

CURRICULA

Undergraduate and graduate curricula in Iraq in general put emphasis on theory and disregard research. Course requirements for undergraduate studies in the five disciplines mentioned above include twenty-five to thirty-five courses, 40%–55% of which are in a field of specialization. Students of sociology, history, and economics take only one course in research methods, which includes instruction in writing techniques, whereas students of anthropology and political sciences do not take any course or instructions in field research methods. The same can be said about graduate students. Though they are required to write a dissertation, the only guide they have is a booklet entitled "A Guide to Graduate Students," issued by the Ministry of Higher Education. It instructs graduate students on how to use citation, references, and bibliography.

As mentioned above, the curricula are defined by the Ministry of Higher Education. In the 1980s, the Ministry of Education went so far as to assign textbooks authored by university professors, mainly from Baghdad University, to be used in the various departments. Some of these textbooks, which were written in the 1980s or 1990s, are still used in a number of departments. References are not provided for Social Science students. For instance, in the history department at Basra University, only one text book and one reference are assigned for each topic; the majority of the references are Arabic encyclopedias or dictionaries.

Table 4.3. Research Centers in Iraq

University	*Center*	*Year of Foundation*	*Number of Researchers*
Baghdad	Education and Psychology	1966	28
	Palestinian Studies	1967	19
	Arabic Scientific Heritage	1977	18
	International Studies	1980	41
	Psychological Research	1986	34
	Baghdad City Center	1990	13
	Market and Consumer Protection Studies	1997	18
Musil	Regional Studies	—	8
	Musil Studies	—	16
Basra	Arab Gulf	1974	35
	Iranian Studies	—	15
	Basra Studies	1989	8
Mustansiriya	Arab Land Studies	—	32
Kufa	Hilla Documents and Studies	1994	8
	Babylonian Studies	—	2
Al-Nahrin	Law and Politics	—	19

LIBRARIES

Wars and sanctions put an end to the qualitative and quantitative development of university libraries in Iraq. Actually, the process started before that, when in 1978, the Ministry of Higher Education banned the purchase and importation of foreign books by university libraries. Most of the university libraries in Iraq are not equipped with computers, have no data base of holdings and do not have enough photocopy machines to serves thousands of graduate students.

There is a huge gap, especially in graduate studies, between the increasing number of students and the number of books held in the libraries. This situation was aggravated by the occupation when the majority of the university libraries were either looted or burned. For instance, in Salahudin University the ratio of books to student is twenty books per student; in the University of Basra it is 8.5 books/student; in the University of Baghdad 4.2 books/student; and in the University of Tikrit 0.6 books/student.

The working hours for the library in most of the university are five to six hours a day, five days a week. The time allocated for checking out books is three and a half hours.

RESEARCH CENTERS

There are seventeen research centers in Iraq with 314 researchers. These centers are based in six universities only. Most of the centers focus on regional or international studies and there is not a single center for social or cultural studies, archaeology, or migration (table 4.3).

BUDGET OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The budget allocated to higher education during the years 2003 to 2005, which includes operating costs and the costs of developing infrastructure, constitutes only 0.6% to 1.0% of the national budget. The budget does not allocate funds for scholarship nor for the development of the libraries and research centers.

The Ministry of Higher Education therefore depends on funding from foreign governments and international agencies for re-building Iraqi universities, the majority of which barely survived the aftermath of the years of war, sanctions, and political unrest. In the years 2004 to 2006, fellowships were provided by a person from the Gulf for forty students at University of London, 150 fellowships to France, and forty fellowships to Russia. The U.S. provided for the training of a number of professors, but only twenty-five fellowships.

LANGUAGE ANNOUNCEMENT

As readers may by aware, TAARII is committed to producing a bilingual newsletter in English and in Arabic. We regret that we are now printing our newsletter in English only. We are seeking funds to resume printing a bilingual newsletter and to include full Arabic translations of English-language newsletters available on our website. We appreciate your patience and understanding in the meantime.

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REPORT

STEPHANIE PLATZ

In this issue, TAARII is pleased to present original research by TAARII U.S. Fellows Denise Natali, Mina Marefat, and Adeed Dawisha, on regional development in Kurdistan, modernist planning for Baghdad University, and the fall of Iraq's monarchy in 1958, respectively. We also feature a summary of a recent report on the Social Sciences in Iraq, and a report on a current exhibit at The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, which addresses the looting of archaeological sites in Iraq.

Our aim for the TAARII newsletter is to share current research on Iraq, across fields in the Humanities and Social Sciences, with readers in Iraq Studies, our membership, and other interested scholars and policymakers. While submissions to our newsletter are not peer-reviewed, we nevertheless intend to provide a forum for multidisciplinary, scholarly exchange related to Iraq that will be of value to specialists. In this sense, we conceive of our newsletter as a hybrid between an academic journal and a newsletter. While we copy-edit submissions, we do not systematically provide substantive commentary to contributors. Our goal, rather, is to enable them to share work in progress with colleagues.

We welcome your feedback on the newsletter and invite contributions from all of our readers.

FELLOWSHIP OPPORTUNITIES

The annual deadline for submission of applications to the *U.S. Fellows Program* is November 15, 2008, for projects beginning as early as March 2009. The annual deadline for the *Iraqis Fellows Program* is February 15, 2009. Applications from U.S.-Iraqi collaborative teams are welcome on a ROLLING basis. Teams of individual U.S. and Iraqi scholars wishing to collaborate may request up to $14,000. For additional information, please visit the TAARII website: www.taarii.org. To submit a collaborative proposal, contact info@taarii.org.

BOOK DONATIONS

TAARII seeks donations for its permanent library. Currently located in the Amman office, this collection will be relocated when the Institute moves to Iraq. To date, TAARII has received the gift of a substantial collection of archaeological sources. TAARII welcomes book donations in this and other fields. In particular, TAARII seeks the donation of *The Encyclopedia of Islam* and the *Index Islamicus*. Please visit the TAARII website for the current catalog of the TAARII library (www.taarii.org). Contact us regarding new donations at info@taarii.org.

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CATASTROPHE! THE LOOTING AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S PAST

KATHARYN HANSON, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In April 2003, reports of the looting of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad briefly focused international media attention on the plight of Iraq's cultural heritage. However, the theft and destruction at the museum in Baghdad is only one part of a much larger problem. Today, over five years later, the ongoing massive looting of Iraq's archaeological sites and the destruction of cultural heritage sites in parts of the country pose a continuing threat to Iraq's past.

To commemorate the fifth anniversary of the looting of the Iraq National Museum and to raise awareness about Iraq's lost cultural heritage, the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute opened a special exhibit entitled: *Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past* (April 10, 2008–December 31, 2008).[1]

Everyone who worked on *Catastrophe!* is deeply troubled by the human suffering in Iraq. This is not diminished by our concern about the continuing destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq. As archaeologists we are in a position to address the importance of preserving Iraq's cultural heritage at sites, museums, and monuments throughout the country. The *Catastrophe!* exhibit allows us the opportunity to educate the public about this tragedy that could have been prevented.

Figure 5.1. A U.S. tank outside the children's section of the Iraq National Museum. This gateway is a replica built in the 1940s based on an artist's interpretation of an ancient Assyrian gateway. A real, ancient Assyrian winged bull in the gateway remained unharmed (Photo: Joanne Farchakh-Bajjaly)

THE IRAQ NATIONAL MUSEUM

The *Catastrophe!* exhibit begins with the looting of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad starting on April 10, 2003. The museum housed the world's largest and most complete collection of ancient Mesopotamian artifacts, as well as documentation for all past archaeological excavations in Iraq. Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, various scholars and organizations warned of the potential damage to Iraq's cultural heritage. The Iraq National Museum staff took steps to safeguard the collection. Manuscripts and archives were placed in an underground bunker while other valuable artifacts were sealed in the vaults of the Central Bank in Baghdad. Museum staff moved smaller artifacts from the public galleries to a secure secret location. Unfortunately, objects too heavy or difficult to remove remained in the galleries.

On April 8, 2003, as U.S. Forces entered Baghdad, the sounds of approaching fighting forced museum staff to flee. It was during this battle between militia and U.S. forces that a gaping hole in the facade of the museum's children's wing was made by a U.S. tank round (figure 5.1). Unfortunately, the U.S. tank continued down the street and the museum remained empty for that day and the next.

On April 10, 2003, looters broke into the unprotected museum. Thanks to the work of Donny George, former Director of the Iraq National Museum, and a U.S. investigation into the looting, we know that there were two

Figure 5.2. Protective cinder block wall broken by a group of looters to enter the basement storage (Photo: McGuire Gibson)

Figure 5.3. Life-sized terra-cotta lion statue damaged during the April 2003 looting. This lion originally guarded the main doorway of a temple at Tell Harmal during the Old Babylonian Period (circa 1800 B.C.). (Photo: Joanne Farchakh-Bajjaly)

separate groups of looters. In one group the looters were professional thieves who stole specific artifacts from the basement storerooms. These looters broke down a protective cinder block wall (figure 5.2). Once inside, they stole an estimated 5,000 cylinder seals and 5,000 pieces of jewelry.[2]

A second, larger group of looters stole and damaged artifacts in the galleries and storerooms (figure 5.3). They also ransacked the museum's archives, offices, and laboratories. One of the most devastating blows to the future understanding of archaeology in Iraq was the disarray and destruction of the files and records in the offices and archives of the State Board of Antiquities which overseas all archaeological sites and activities, including the museum. The structural damage to the museum building can be repaired, and office or lab equipment can be replaced, but it will take years to restore the institutional memory (figure 5.4).

On April 12, museum staff drove the looters out and four days later, U.S. forces secured the building. Starting April 22, a U.S. investigation of the looting at the museum began along with an inventory by the museum staff. Some objects were returned voluntarily or seized. One of the objects returned was the Warka vase, a masterpiece of early Mesopotamian art. Museum curators have painstakingly restored it (figures 5.5–5.6).

Figure 5.5. When looters stole the Warka vase, they broke the main body of the vase away from its display case, leaving the modern plaster base (Photo: John Russell)

Figure 5.4. Some of the archives of the Iraq National Museum damaged in the looting of April 2003 (Photo: Joanne Farchakh-Bajjaly)

It will be impossible to determine the true number of artifacts stolen until the Iraq National Museum can verify its entire inventory. It has been estimated that roughly 15,000 objects were taken from the museum's total of 501,000 holdings. Up to now, roughly 6,000 of the stolen artifacts have been returned or recovered.[3]

While the museum staff works on conservation and restoration, the ongoing violence in Baghdad continues to impact the museum and its staff. In January 2006, a car bomb exploded next to the Children's Museum and in August 2006, fifty people were kidnapped on the street near the museum.[4]

Currently, the Iraq National Museum remains closed to the public. Except for construction work and brief press events, the entire museum building is closed and only staff has access to the museum's offices and laboratories. The museum staff continues to work on restoration and recovery efforts. To address the security situation in Baghdad, they have installed security doors and resealed gateways (figure 5.7). International donations and expertise have made possible new security systems, lighting, and a computer network.

LOOTING OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN IRAQ

Thousands of archaeological and cultural heritage sites exist in Iraq. Prior to the 2003 war, the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and Heritage discouraged looting by employing site guards and sponsoring official excavations. As the 2003 invasion of Iraq began, looting started. Site guards simply did not have enough weaponry and manpower to prevent the looters from digging. Small and large sites across Iraq are now pockmarked with looters' pits. Iraqi archaeologists are well aware of the problem, yet they can do little in Iraq's current security situation.[5]

Although archaeological sites are endangered throughout Iraq, the sites in the south have been hit the hardest. Archaeologists estimate that over 150 ancient Sumerian cities and towns have been greatly damaged. Umma is one of these cities. The Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage excavated at Umma from 1999 until 2003. Today the top five to ten meters of the site have been eaten away by looters' pits, leav-



Figure 5.6. After the Warka vase's return, Iraq National Museum conservators worked to reconstruct it (Photo: Donny George)

ing a moonscape (figure 5.8).

But this scarred landscape tells only half the story. At the bottom of some of these pits are horizontal tunnels dug by looters to stay out of the desert sun and to exploit the most profitable layers of artifacts. Additionally, the standing ruins at these archaeological sites are vulnerable to looters searching for bricks stamped with cuneiform inscriptions (figure 5.9). Recent news stories about eight major sites, indicating that the looting is not occurring, ignore the evidence of continuing illegal digging at many other sites.

Figure 5.7. In response to increasing violence, doors in the Iraq National Museum were welded shut and sealed with reinforced concrete and cinder blocks (Photo: Donny George)

WHAT LOOTING DESTROYS

Looting at ancient sites destroys archaeological context, and it is this context that provides an artifact's story. Archaeological context is the location where an artifact was found, the material surrounding that artifact, and its relationship to other objects. In a controlled archaeological excavation, context is identified and carefully recorded. Archaeologists measure and record an artifact's location (figure 5.10). These details are preserved in excavation records and are available for further study as well as for comparison to other sites and artifacts, thus contributing to our overall understanding of ancient societies. When an artifact is looted, it is ripped from its context and all of its potential contextual information is lost forever. Ancient artifacts may be considered beautiful alone, but without archaeological context these pretty objects simply represent lost knowledge.

THE MARKET BEHIND THE LOOTING

The market for antiquities is huge, and in recent years the financial value of ancient Mesopotamian artifacts has skyrocketed. For example, in 2001, a single high quality cylinder seal sold for $424,000 in New York. More recently, in 2007, a small statue sold for a staggering $57 million. We can assume that prices in the shadowy illegal market have also escalated. In this illegal art market the largest share of the profits goes to art dealers at the end of a long chain of smugglers. At the bottom of this chain is the looter who usually scavenges artifacts for a meager subsistence income. Looting is often done by those who lack job opportunities and have no other means of support for themselves and their families. It has been estimated that a looter receives less than $50 for a cylinder seal or a cuneiform tablet that may ultimately sell for hundreds of times that sum.[6]

The artifacts most vulnerable to theft are those that are the most commercially desirable. In Iraq, looters target cylinder seals and tablets with cuneiform writing because collectors value them. The trade in looted antiquities spans the globe. An artifact wrenched from the ground in Iraq will travel thousands of miles and change hands many times before it reaches its final destination in a private collection. Artifacts stolen from Iraq have been seized at many major international airports and cities including: Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, London, Paris, Geneva, Madrid, Sardinia, Damascus, and Dubai. Additionally, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all have reported seizing stolen artifacts from Iraq at border crossings (figure 5.11).

The illicit market for stolen artifacts continues to have disastrous consequences for Iraq. Not only does this market encourage the theft of the country's heritage, but it also adds to the violence. In Iraq, the profits from the sale of looted artifacts often fund the purchase of illegal weapons. The continued looting of antiquities and their illegal purchase in other countries directly contribute to the cycle of violence in Iraq.



Figure 5.8. Looters at work at the ancient site of Isin in January, 2004 (Photo: John Russell)

Figure 5.9. Destruction of temple facade at Umma by looters searching for bricks stamped with cuneiform inscriptions (Photo: Joanne Farchakh-Bajjaly)

Figure 5.10. Alexandra Witsell, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago, measures and maps stratigraphy. Unlike looters, archaeologists carefully record the horizontal and vertical locations of architecture, artifacts, and organic remains before removing anything from the ground (Photo: Katharyn Hanson)

WHAT CAN WE DO?

Here in the United States we can take action to help discourage further destruction of Iraq's past.

- Refuse to buy antiquities of unknown origin.
- Learn about the importance of archaeological context by visiting museums and excavations.
- Inquire about the acquisition policies of museums in your area to ensure the museum adheres to standards that require clear documentation about the past history of any artifact.
- Support organizations working to document and preserve cultural property.
- Encourage the U.S. government to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
- Urge your elected representatives and senators to require the U.S. military maintain personnel who are equipped and trained in cultural heritage preservation and to incorporate them into the planning of military action.

Within Iraq, the future of cultural heritage depends on the brave work of Iraqi archaeologists and museum employees (figure 12). We can support their important work by raising awareness about what has been lost and what can be done to help protect it's cultural heritage in the future. When an artifact is wrenched from its archaeological context it is another loss to our deeper understanding of our shared origins.

The author would like to thank McGuire Gibson, Donny George, John Russell, Joanne Farchakh, and Micah Garen for the photos included in this article.

[1] I would like to thank McGuire Gibson who was co-curator of this exhibit. I would also like to thank Geoff Emberling and the Oriental Institute's talented museum staff for their work on *Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past*. Parts of this article are adapted from the exhibit text. The images included here are displayed in the exhibit and are republished here with permission of the photographers.

Figure 5.11. Artifacts recovered by police in Baghdad, June 2004 (Photo: Micah Garen, Four Corners Media)

[2] Donny George and McGuire Gibson, "The Looting of the Iraq Museum Complex," in *Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past,* edited by Geoff Emberling and Katharyn Hanson (Oriental Institute Museum Publications 28; Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 2008), pp. 20–21.

[3] Ibid., p. 26.

[4] Personal communication with Donny George, January 2008.

[5] John Russell, "Efforts to Protect Archaeological Sites and Monuments in Iraq, 2003–2004," in *Catastrophe!,* p. 33.

[6] McGuire Gibson, "The Looting of the Iraq Museum in Context" in *Catastrophe!,* p. 18.

Figure 5.12. Iraqi archaeologist Abdul Amir Hamdani and Iraqi police inspect a looted archaeological site, May 2004. Hamdani is assigned to the Nasiriya District in southern Iraq. He and the few antiquities Iraqi Police have prevented some looting in this region (Photo: Micah Garen, Four Corners Media)

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